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A legitimate business?  
Representations of Privatised Probation in England & Wales 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Transforming Rehabilitation reforms implemented in England & Wales in 2014 
witnessed the transfer of responsibility for a large proportion of the work of the public 
sector probation service to 21 newly created Community Rehabilitation Companies 
(CRCs), which were contracted out to a range of providers dominated by private sector 
interests. This part-privatisation of probation services has raised important questions 
about the legitimacy of the new organisations in the eyes of both internal and external 
audiencesǡǮǯ
any legitimacy deficits they themselves perceive. This article presents the findings of an 
analysis of the websites of all 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies, and considers 
what these externally-facing representations of the CRCs suggest about legitimation 
work in the private probation sector. Our analysis suggests that CRCs use some of the Ǯǯ- the 
private security industry Ȃ and are similarly ambivalent about what Ȃ and to whom Ȃ ǮǯǤds new light on old 
questions about how the somewhat intangible goods of probation work can be captured 
and communicated to a mixed constituency of potential stakeholders, as well as raising 
new questions about the role of websites (and other marketing materials) in that 
endeavour.  
 
Key-words: Probation, Privatisation, Legitimation, Website Analysis, Transforming 
Rehabilitation.  
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Introduction 
 
Despite being a major part of the criminal justice system, responsible for the 
supervision of more than 200,000 offenders each year, the probation service in England 
& Wales Ǯǯ
understood by other actors in and beyond criminal justice (Mawby & Worrall 2013; 
Pithouse 1998). Not only is probation an occupation that is conducted largely beyond 
public view, it has also traditionally lacked a powerful voice capable of communicating, 
at a national level, its mission, its successes and its challenges (Mawby & Worrall 2013). 
This absence of a strong national identity, and the hidden nature of the work, are some 
of the reasons that probation has also been relatively neglected by penal sociologists, 
who have tended to focus their attention on the prison (McNeill 2019; Robinson 2016a). 
It also helps to explain how the Coalition Government was able to push through its 
Transforming Rehabilitation reforms (Ministry of Justice 2013), which radically 
restructured the service, relatively easily and quietly (Robinson 2016b). 
The Transforming Rehabilitation reforms swept away 35 public sector probation Trusts 
and replaced them with a new two-tier structure: a much smaller public sector National 
Probation Service (primarily responsible for the supervision of high risk offenders and 
the provision of pre-sentence advice to courts) and 21 new Community Rehabilitation 
Companies (responsible for supervising low-medium risk offenders). As part of this 
process, more than half of the work - and workforce - of the public sector probation 
service was transferred to the 21 new Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) 
which, in 2015, were contracted out to a range of providers dominated by private sector 
interests (Robinson 2016b).  
This significant transfer of responsibility for the delivery of public probation services to 
the private sector raises important questions about the legitimacy of the new 
organisations, in the eyes of both internal and external audiences (Robinson et al 2016). 
Although probation work, with its focus on engaging with stigmatised groups of people, 
has been understood as a type of socially ǡǮǯȋƬǡ ? ? ? ?ǣ
8), its relocation in the private sector suggests that it miǮǯǡǤǯ
experiences has been conducted since Transforming Rehabilitation, there is evidence to 
suggest that the part-privatisation of probation services Ȃ ǮǯȂ has been a source of discomfort for at least some of those whose roles (as 
workers) have transferred to the new CRCs (e.g. Robinson et al 2016; Deering & Feilzer 
2015; Walker et al 2019). However, less is known about perceptions of the private 
probation sector beyond its internal constituency of employees, nor about how the CRCs 
have sought to construct and communicate their purposes, values and identities as new 
and legitimate organisational entities, to a potentially wide range of stakeholder groups.  
In this article, we focus our attention on those processes of identity construction, and 
consider how Ȃ and to whom - ǮǯȋƬ
 ? ? ? ?ǢBarker 2001; Robinson et al 2017). To this end we 
draw on recent research in the field of private security, which has addressed similar Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?; White 2010, 
2014). However, we depart from the methods used in this extant body of research1, 
                                               
1 Thumala et al. (2011) interviewed 19 stakeholders from different sectors of the security industry and 
analysed a strategic sample of security magazines. ǯ(2010) research was based on a combination 
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turning instead to the websites of the 21 CRCs. These websites, we suggest, constitute 
the main vehicle through which organizational identities are communicated to external 
audiences and open a window on the Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
in that process of communication. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
systematically examine the websites of probation services in England & Wales Ȃ and 
possibly internationally.  
The article begins by setting the scene for our analysis, with a brief overview of the 
Transforming Rehabilitation reforms as the latest and most radical of a series of 
organizational changes in the Anglo-Welsh probation field. We then outline our 
methodolǡǯ (2012) multi-modal framework for 
website analysis. We go on to present our findings in three main sections which address, 
respectively, representations of organizational identity; Ǯǯf the CRCsǢǮǯǮǯ
work. In our concluding discussion we draw together our principal findings in respect of 
what the analysis appears to tell us about the legitimation of probation work in the 
private sector. We also consider the limitations of our research and suggest some 
avenues for future enquiry.  
 
Setting the scene 
 
The English and Welsh probation service is among the longest established in Europe 
(Vanstone 2004), but its recent history is one characterized by significant and rapid 
change. Not only has the service been exposed to the influences of the kinds of broad 
social and political developments which have affected the punishment field more ȋǮǯies; the growth of managerialism and 
the rise of risk as a key concept in criminal justice and other public services) (see inter-
alia: Garland, 2001; Simon and Sparks, 2012); but it has also been subject to a number 
of specific strategies designed to change the way it is organised and delivered. In the last 
20 years in particular, there have been major changes affecting the organisation and 
governance of the service; the profile and training of its practitioners; the size and ǯads; and the official purposes of probation supervision 
(Robinson 2016b). A particularly controversial development, in the late 1990s, was the 
severing of probation officer training from its traditional grounding in social work 
education. This development was instigated by a Conservative government keen to Ǯǯǯǡ
punitive nature of community-based penalties. With regard to its organisation, the 
service has been through several major structural changes since the turn of the century. 
In 2001, the 42 probation areas were drawn together under the umbrella of a National 
Probation Service (NPS) for the first time, and then in 2004 the NPS was subsumed into 
a new National Offender Management Service (NOMS) alongside the prison service. The 
end of that decade brought further organisational change, with the creation of 35 
Probation Trusts in place of the preceding 42 area services.  
                                               
of archival work, analysis of government and industry documents and semi structured interviews with 
government and private security elites. His subsequent study of the outsourcing of policing functions in 
one police force area was based on an analysis of government and police documents and semi-structured 
interviews with police officers/staff and private security staff working inside the Lincs-G4S strategic 
partnership (White 2014). 
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However, by far the greatest rupture experienced by the service came in 2014, when the 
C
ǯTransforming Rehabilitation (TR) reforms began to be 
implemented (Ministry of Justice 2013). A principal objective of this package of reforms 
was the creation of a market for the delivery of probation services, centred on 
enhancing innovation, efficiency and effectiveness (Robinson et al 2016). On 1 June 
2014 the TR reforms replaced the 35 Probation Trusts with a new, two-tier structure: a 
public sector National Probation Service (NPS) with responsibility for the supervision of 
high risk offenders; and 21 new Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) with 
responsibility for managing low- and medium-risk offenders. These 21 new 
organisations were subject to a competitive bidding process which took place in the 
latter part of 2014 and in February 2015 the 21 CRCs2 were let by the Ministry of Justice 
to eight successful bidders.  
 
The eight parent companies varied in size and scale, but the majority (n=7) were 
dominated by private sector interests. Some of the private companies were already 
involved on a global level in delivering outsourced government contracts, whilst others 
established consortia in order to secure and deliver the CRC contracts. Two bidders 
(Sodexo Justice Services) and Purple Futures (an Interserve-led company) secured more 
than half of the CRC contracts between them. Sodexo is a global outsourcing company 
which was established in France in the 1960s and originally specialized in catering 
provision. Its subsidiary, Sodexo Justice Services, was founded in 1993 and, in 
partnership with a national charity (NACRO) it won six CRC contracts. Interserve, 
another global outsourcing company, led the Purple Futures consortium and was 
awarded the contract to run five CRCs.3 Seven further contracts were won by three 
bidders (Working Links with three; MTC Novo and the Reducing Reoffending Partnership 
with two each)4 and the remaining three CRCs were each let to a separate provider: 
Seetec Justice; EOS Works and Achieving Real Change in Communities (ARCC). Of the eight 
parent companies winning contracts, ARCC was the only not-for-profit body, comprising 
a consortium of nine partners from different sectors including local authorities, 
charities, other philanthropic bodies and social enterprise organisations.  
 
The Transforming Rehabilitation reforms were the subject of vociferous critique from 
many quarters. Some critics were opposed in principle to the marketisation of public 
services, particularly within the criminal justice system (Burke and Collett, 2016). The 
model of payment for CRCs involved initial funding through government contracts and a 
Payment by Results (PbR) model, where CRCs would be financially rewarded for 
demonstrable reductions in offending. This model was considered flawed as some 
argued there would be no way of demonstrating cause and effect Ȃ specifically that any 
reductions in offending could be directly attributable to CRCs (Albertson and Fox, 
                                               
2 Twelve of the 21 CRCs were single contract package areas, meaning that they were created from a single 
Probation Trust. The other 9 CRCs were made up of two or more combined Trust areas. 
3 The Purple Futures consortium comprised Interserve as the lead partner, a national homeless charity 
(Shelter), a social enterprise group (P3) and an organization providing contract support to the Third 
sector (3SC). 
4 ǯǮ-to-ǯ
initiatives and it became the largest single work programme provider in the United Kingdom. The 
Management and Training Corporation (MTC) operates a third of all correctional facilities in the United 
States. MTC Novo was the name of the venture led by MTC UK, which was awarded the contract for 
London and Thames Valley CRCs. 
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2019). Others noted the fact that the reforms were based on a false premise, i.e. that 
probation services were not adequately addressing recidivism amongst people who 
were sentenced to short prison sentences; pointing out that this cohort was not in fact 
subject to probation supervision prior to the TR reforms (Cracknell, 2018).5 One of the 
most compelling criticisms questioned the logic of dividing services on the basis of risk, 
given that risk changes over time (Robinson 2016b) and creating a split in services 
would result in cases falling through the cracks. By the time that we began our research 
the volume of criticisms had increased, as seen by various negative commentaries from 
a range of quarters including the Inspectorate of Probation, the National Audit Office 
and the House of Commons Justice Committee (Carr 2018).  
 
As has been noted in the organisational studiesǯ literature, all new organisations face 
challenges in terms of establishing or building their legitimacy (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990; 
Suchman 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002). Community Rehabilitation Companies, as 
new entities in the criminal justice field, are clearly no exception. But as the above ǡǮǯ
(Stinchcombe 1965), but also with the liabilities associated with all of the above 
critiques: not least their displacement of an existing organisational entity which had a 
long history and established reputation in the public sector. In this regard, it is useful to 
look to the adjacent field of private security, in which a struggle for legitimacy has been 
relatively well documented. According to White (2010) the emergence of a private 
security industry has challenged deep-ǲǯexpectation that security provision ought to be monopolised by the ǳmmercial interests (White 2010: 174). White 
has observed that, in an effort to counter this cultural resistance, private security firms 
have employed a range of legitimation strategies which have centred on conferring 
upon themselves qualities associated wǮǯǤ
requests for police endorsement; the fabrication of links with police forces; calculated ǮǯǢǮǯ
from ǯus via the issuing of police-style uniforms for private ȋ ? ? ? ?Ǣ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
players in the private security industry. However, their study is also of interest because 
it revealed among interviewees a surprising reluctance to seek legitimation for their Ǯǯǡ
market shares. Thumala et al (2011) sought to explain this finding with reference to two ǣǡǲǳǢ, secondlyǡǲǳȋ298-99). The latter, they contend, creates a legitimacy deficit and 
a sense of moral ambivalence among the purveyors of private security.  
 
 
Methodology 
                                               
5 It is important to note that extending probation supervision to this cohort (i.e. short-sentenced 
prisoners), formed one of the central rationalising pillars for Transforming Rehabilitation, and as part of 
the reforms anyone released from a custodial sentence of less than 12 months, was automatically made 
subject to a period of post-release supervision. However, as Cracknell (2018) notes, rather than providing 
services, this reform merely widened the net of punishment, resulting in a significant increase in the 
numbers of people recalled to prison.  
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At the outset of this project we established that each of the 21 CRCs had its own website. 
These websites were created when the CRCs were established and the websites of the 
former 35 Probation Trusts were taken down when they ceased to exist. In contrast, the 
new NPS did not have a distinct web-presence: rather, it is represented on a generic 
governmental website (GOV.UK) that encompasses a range of government 
organisations.6 We therefore confined our analysis to the 21 CRCs and did not 
separately analyse or compare these, either with the relatively scant information on the 
NPS web-page, or the websites of the former Trusts (which were no longer accessible). 
We began by downloading the entire content of each CRC website during a one-week 
time-period in January, 2019 using Adobe DC Acrobat software in order to create a PDF 
of the content of each website. This allowed us to compile an archive of the websites in a 
particular time period and a database of content in order to undertake analysis. Table 1 
provides an overview of the CRCs and their parent companies in January 2019.  
 
[insert Table 1 around here] 
 
We approached the analysis guided by the following research questions: How do CRCs 
represent their work through their websites? What do these representations suggest 
about the legitimation strategies of the CRCs? Our analysis was guiǯ
(2012) multi-modal framework for web-site analysis and particularly informed by the 
application of this framework by Johnson and Carneiro (2014), who used this approach 
to analyse museum websites. Following Johnson and Carneiro (2014) we adopted the 
first four ǯto systematically analyse the websites. This 
framework encouraged us to adopt a wide lens when looking at the material, and to 
consider variables we might otherwise have neglected or overlooked. The four stages 
were as follows: 1) Qualitative preservation of first impressions and reactions; 2) 
Qualitative inventory of salient and absent features; 3) In-depth analysis of content and 
formal choices and 4) Analysis of embedded points of view, implied audience(s) and 
purposes (see also: Johnson and Caneiro, 2014). Following the preservation of the 
content as described above, each of the authors separately reviewed the database of 
archived material, and made notes of our initial impressions and reactions (Stage 1).  In 
particular we noted our impressions of the visual aesthetics of the sites including 
imagery, colour palettes, logos and the extent of information provided on the sites. For 
instance, one of our initial impressions was that some of the websites featured extensive 
content, while others were much sparser, and in some instances were out of date. 
Where one company owned several CRCs we also recorded our observations about the 
similarity or otherwise between the websites of the CRCs operated by that company. 
 
We proceeded, again independently, to the subsequent stages of analysis by collecting 
information on a coding sheet for each of the CRCs. Here we recorded in-depth 
information on the content and structure of each website, noting key salient features 
and through a process of cross-comparison any absent features (e.g. some websites 
contained information on the cost of services, while others did not, a point we discuss Ȍȋ ? ?ȌǤǮǯ
perceived the websites to be targeted, and thematically analysed the content of each site 
(Stage 4). In some instances it was clear that there were particular target audiences as 
                                               
6 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-probation-service 
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ǤǤǮǯwho Ǯǯǡǡ
that we discuss further below.  
 
In relation to our own positionality it is important to note that both authors have a 
familiarity with the probation field having conducted research on different aspects of 
probation over a number of years. We therefore have an awareness of the subject that 
inevitably informed our gaze and analysis (Mirzoeff, 2015). We tried to be conscious 
about how this familiarity might influence both what we saw and our subsequent 
interpretations. We therefore approached our analyses reflexively by recording our 
observations as field-notes independently before meeting to compare our initial 
impressions. This allowed us to be more explicit in our understandings, for instance 
which areas of the websites we considered most relevant (home-page/about us) to 
elaborate on definitions and meanings (e.g. what we meant by models of interventions) 
and to focus our analysis accordingly.  
 
After we had separately completed our analysis of the 21 websites, we discussed and 
compared our findings. This led us to the development of a more refined coding 
approach, which included a more explicit focus on what appeared to us to be potential 
strategies of legitimation. In the following sections we present and discuss our findings 
in relation to three broad themes: visual and textual representations of organizational 
identity; the use of images, words and numbers to portray their work; and the 
construction of audiences or ǮǯǤ 
 
Ǯǯǣǫ 
 
As noted above, one element of our analysis involved looking for common visual and 
textual  ? ?ǡǮǯ
of CRCs owned by the same parent company. With five of the eight parent companies 
owning more than one CRC, we were interested to see whether they had sought to 
standardise oǮǯǤWe 
were also interested in the extent to which the parent companies themselves would be 
visible. Relatedly, we examined the extent to which websites emphasised the ǯǮǯǡand/or acknowledged the longer history of probation, either locally or as a 
national service. 
 
Brand recognition 
 
Organisations engage in branding in order to promote a product or service and to 
communicate their values and identity (Lane Keller and Lehmann, 2006). Although 
generally little discussed in the context of criminal justice, Annison et al (2015) have 
considǮǯȋȌ
projects, which involve joint working between probation and police. They suggest that Ǯǯ
specifiǲǮǯǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
potentially important role of branding at times of organizational change, when 
orgǮǯǤ
conditions, branding can contribute to the development of a new identity that serves 
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both organizational members and external audiences in making sense of a new 
environment (Gioia et al 2000). 
 
In the probation context, the first clear attempt to develop a common visual brand dates 
back to a time of significant change for the service, when there was a move from 
localized management to more centralized coordination and control, i.e. when the first 
iteration of a National Probation Service came into being (NPS 2001). Although not Ǯǯǡ
introduction of a distinctive logo, and a specific colour palette, that was to become a 
familiar feature of probation nameplates, letterheads, websites and policy documents 
thereafter.7 The logo was a pattern of purple and white blocks, and the colour palette 
was dominated by the colour purple. These visual motifs continued to identify each of 
the 35 Probation Trusts when they replaced what had been 42 probation areas after 
2008.  
 
Our analysis revealed not only that the probation logo had survived the transition from 
Trusts to CRCs, but furthermore that this was in fact a mandated branding exercise on 
the part of the (now defunct) National Offender Management Service (NOMS): an ǲ
services following structural changes fro ? ? ? ? ?ǳ
came into effect (NOMS 2014a: 3). The original logo Ȃ which was an image with no text Ȃ Ǯǯ
image. This duly appeared in a prominent position on all of the 21 CRC homepages, 
accompanied in each case by the name of the CRC area. Figure 1 shows examples of the 
use of this logo by three CRCs operated by different companies. 
 
[insert Figure 1 around here] 
Beyond this common branding, the purple palette was prominent on all but one CRC 
website, and we interpreted this too as a deliberate strategy among CRCs, designed to 
promote recognition Ǯǯamong potential audiences. This, however, 
was not mandated by NOMS, and we suggest that it could be understood as an example 
of Ǯsǯ; a strategy of legitimation which has been noted in studies of 
the private security industry (Thumala et al, 2011). Symbolic borrowing refers to the 
deliberate adoption of visual emblems associated with other, related professions, which 
enjoy public legitimacy. In the case of the private security industry, which has been ǮǯǮǯ:   
The use of uniforms, badges and vehicles that resemble those of the police (and are 
designed to do so) are all indicative of an attempt to secure legitimacy by association. 
(Thumala et al, 2011:294) 
In the probation context, then, symbolic borrowing could be seen in the strategy of 
continuing to use the colour purple in the text, banners etc. of CRC webpages. The same 
can be said of the particular name chosen by Interserve to denote the partnership it led 
to success in the outsourcing competition: Purple Futures. Ǯǯǡonly two (Purple Futures and 
Working Links) had obviously standardised the appearance ǯǤ In 
                                               
7 Ǯǯn work, which we discuss further in 
the next section. 
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both cases, an identical template was evident on the homepages, but the degree of 
consistency was greatest among the five Purple Futures sites, which looked identical 
apart from the CRCǯ name at the top. Although the Working Links homepages were 
also standardised to a large degree in terms of their layout, they featured some variety 
in their choice of images (discussed further below). Beyond generic formatting ǡǮǯanies was also 
apparent ǮǯǡǤ
Sodexo, with the largest CRC family (n=6), appeared to have left each area to its own 
devices with regard to visual representation: there was no evidence among the six that 
they were under shared ownership.  
 
Part of unfolding history? 
 
Given what we took as examples of symbolic borrowing in a number of cases, we were 
interested to explore other ways in which the CRCs might have sought to promote the ǯȂ whether the immediate inheritance of the 
Probation Trusts (in operation from 2008), or the legacy of probation services which 
were established in the early part of the 20th century (Mair and Burke, 2013).  Indeed, 
we found that a number of CRCs linked their organization with a wider narrative about 
probation that stretched back over a century. For example, in the London CRC, under a 
drop-down tab - Ǯǯ- there waǮǯǡd a timeline dating from 1876 when Ǯǯ
MTCNovo in 2015. This timeline featured other key dates, including the passage of the 
Probation of Offenders Act (1907), the introduction of Multi-Agency Public Protection 
Arrangements (MAPPA) in 2001 and the establishment of the National Offender 
Management Service (NOMS) in 2004. Similarly, the website of the Staffordshire and 
West Midlands CRC provided Ǯǯd the appointment of the first 
police court missionary in the late nineteenth century up until the establishment of the 
Midlands Consortium (the precursor to the transfer of the CRC into private ownership) 
in 2013.  
Not all of the CRC websites included such extensive historical information, however. In 
fact some presented rather more ǮǯǤ	ǡ
Thames Valley CRC (TV-CRC) simply noted its formation on June 1 2014, following the 
implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, the dissolution of the Probation 
Trusts and the simultaneous establishment of the new National Probation Service. In 
something of a nod to continuity, however, this section of the website did note its 
inheritance of existing employees of the Thames Valley Probation Trust. Similarly, the 
Warwickshire and West Mercia CRC presented a very brief historical narrative, noting 
the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms and the merger of two former Trust areas.  
Another CRC (Essex) situated its history within a broader narrative of the Ǯǯits 
parent company (Sodexo) and its ȋȌǮǯǮǯǤ 
ǯǫprominence and visibility of parent companies 
This latter observation leads us to the question of the prominence/visibility (or 
otherwise) of the various parent companies. References to a parent company were by 
no means uniform across the websites, and their visibility was similarly varied. The 
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most prominent example was Kent, Surrey and Sussex CRC, which featured the name of 
its owner, Seetec Justice, in a large font in a central position at the top of the homepage. 
The names of three other parent companies (Interserve, Working Links and MTC Novo) 
appeared fairly prominently (albeit in small text) Ǯǯ
logo ǯ (see Figure 1).  
 
The other four parent companies were however ǯǤǮSodexo ǯǯ
homepages (alongside a separate logo for its partner, NACRO), the two CRCs operated 
by the Reducing Reoffending Partnership did not mention a parent company on their 
homepages at all; nor did the websites of the only CRC owned by EOS. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, the website of the only CRC that was not owned or led by a private 
company (Durham Tees Valley) did not feature this fact about its parent company on its 
homepage, but rather included this oǮǯpage, which revealed that ȋǮǡǯȌǤ 
 
Information on the ownership and governance structures of the CRCs was thus 
provided in some form on most of the websites, but it was rarely prominent: in several 
cases it was necessary to actively seek this out. Thus, at least some information could be 
gleaned about the parent company of each CRC, and in a number of instances hyperlinks 
were available which provided a direct link to the parent company. For instance, the 
websites of the CRCs owned by Sodexo Ǯ
ǯǮǯǤHere it was noted that the CRCs ǮǯǮǯ
section of the UK Sodexo site. There information was provided on the fact that Sodexo ǡǯǮ
ǯǡǯǡ
work in prisons in Europe, Australia and Chile. Similarly, the websites of the CRCs 
operated by Purple Futures Ǯ	ǯǡ
and the wider Interserve group which again extends globally, with services ranging ǮǯǮǯǤǡpart of a wider 
portfolio of outsourced government services, this was not immediately evident from 
any of the homepages of the websites, but a more thorough search eventually revealed 
this information.  
 
 
Ǯǯǣǫ 
 
One oft-Ǯǯof a recognizable visual iconography 
(Robinson 2016a; Mawby & Worrall 2013; Happer et al, 2018). Probation officers do not 
wear badges or uniforms, and probation offices are not readily identifiable places (Shah, 
2015). Indeed one of the critiques of probation practice has been its perceived failure to 
convey publicly what it does (Worrall et al 2017). We were thus interested to record 
examples of strategies used by the CRCs to communicate the nature of their work to 
audiences. Below we discuss three such strategies, centred on the use of images, words 
and numbers respectively. 
 
Picturing probation 
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Without exception, the CRC homepages included photographic images to help convey 
something about their work. Our analysis revealed that there were two ubiquitous types 
of image, relating to the two longest established formǮǯǣ supervision 
and unpaid work in the community (e.g. see Robinson & McNeill 2017). Attempts to 
capture the central practice of Ǯǯ very common and typically featured 
two adults, with one apparently focused on listening to the other. The latter (the 
supervisee, we surmised) was often pictured with his or her back to the camera (see 
Figure 2 for an example). Images of unpaid work were a little more varied, but typically 
featured men in high visibility bibs or jackets, most often doing outdoor work (e.g. 
digging or gardening) (see NOMS 2014b) (see Figure 3). Rarer images which we read as 
attempts to convey something aboǮǯǡȋȌǮǯǡ
whiteboard or flipchart (e.g. Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire & Rutland). 
[insert Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
Another image which appeared more than once was the CRC nameplate on an exterior 
wall (e.g. London; Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire & Rutland). Although 
rather uninspiring, these images were perhaps an attempt to communicate the ǮǯǤǯǣǡ
Dorset, Devon & Cornwall homepage included a link to a short film about an unpaid ǡƬǯ
about local arts projects in which service users had participated. Finally, we found a 
small number of generic positive images with no obvious connection to probation work: 
e.g. a smiling woman serving food (Purple Futures homepages); a woman riding a horse 
and a woman riding a bicycle (both Durham Tees Valley/ARCC).  
Ǯǯ 
As mentioned above, a common feature of the majority of the CRC homepages was a Ǯǯǡ ǲǡǳȋȌǤSuch 
straplines have been common in the probation context since at least 2001, when the 
first National Probation Service was created. Its first strapline, designed to emphasise 
its multiple aims, was Ǯǡǯ (Home Office 
2001). In our analysis, straplines were as likely to be found on the websites of CRCs 
owned by ǮǯǮǯǤǡ Purple Futures, Working 
Links and MTC Novo each had a single strapline that appeared on the websites of all of Ǯǯ, but the same was not true for the Sodexo-owned CRCs (n=6). Only half of 
these featured a strapline, and they were all different. This finding chimed with the fact, 
discussed above, that Sodexo had done little to establish a common brand or visual 
identity among its CRCs.  
 
Straplines featured between one and three statements. Examples of single statements ǮǯȋȀSodexoȌǮǯ
(Durham Tees Valley/ARCC). Those with more than one statement were all variants of 
the Purple Futures Ǯǡǡǯǡ
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outcomes for both individuals and communities/the public. Less common, but 
nonetheless evident on a number of sites, were links to positive case studies and other 
positive news stories. For example, the Kent, Surrey & Sussex homepage included a link ǮǣǯǤthree of the Working Links homepages included a link ǮǯǤǡǮǯȀȋǤg. Thames Valley). 
Probation by numbers Ǯǯǡand to capture values or priorities in a 
strapline, a few CRC homepages featured attempts to convey something about the 
quantitative aspects of their operations. For examǣǲ
responsible for supervising around 5000 participants on either a Community Order or ǳǤǮǯǣǲ
caseload: 6,700 cases a year. Our workforce is approximately 3 ? ?ǳǤ
CRC homepage also included statistics about the number of staff, offenders, unpaid 
work hours and the population of the area. The homepage of the Staffordshire and West 
Midlands CRC included Ǯ		ǯpared the cost of 
custody with probation. Figure 4 shows an example of the use of such infographics 
from the website of one CRC.  
[insert Figure 4 around here] 
The use of infographics has become an increasingly popular means of data visualisation, 
and many organisations use them to convey information on their work and productivity 
(Lankow et al, 2012). For the purpose of our analysis of CRCs it is interesting to note the 
discursive and legitimation work of such graphics. From the example above we see that 
these figures help to convey the volume and scale of the enterprise and by implication 
the importance of its role within the criminal justice system and to wider society. This 
graph positions this activity beside an icon linking to ǯ latest re-ǯǤ
positioning of the CRC activity is directly connected Ǯǯ
recidivism (although as we noted earlier, linking this metric to the activities of CRCs is 
clearly problematic). More broadly the depiction of probation by numbers provides 
further evidence of the extent to which the net of supervision has widened. This 
phenomenon which has been coined Ǯǯin the 
United Kingdom and in the international context, where the numbers of people subject 
to supervision far exceeds the population of people held in prison (see for instance: 
Phelps, 2013; Aebi et al, 2015; McNeill, 2019).  
 
Constructing audiences and Ǯconsumersǯ of probation services  
 
The question of who is the consumer or beneficiary of probation services has been 
contested over many years (Weaver, 2011). In particular, the debate has centred on the ǮǯǮǯǡtraditionally been seen as the recipient 
and beneficiary of probation services. An increased emphasis on public protection, risk 
management and the needs of victims within probation services in England and Wales 
from the 1990s onwards formed the backdrop fǮ
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ǯ
real client - the wider public (see for instance: Nash, 1996; McCulloch and McNeill, 
2007).  
  ? ? ? ?ǡǮǯǮǯ
services: the public; offenders and victims; ministers and civil servants; and sentencers. ǡǯ 
constituency, as the principal Ǯcommissionersǯ of community-based sentences. Arguably 
this remains true today: in the absence of demand for probation services from the 
courts, probation services would be obsolete. However, the restructuring of probation 
services under Transforming Rehabilitation has changed this picture somewhat. One of 
the many concerns voiced about the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms was that 
private companies might take advantage of the traditional role of probation in providing 
pre-ǡǮǯ
maximising their own profits. To address this concern, the provision of pre-sentence 
information to the courts remained with the public sector part of the service Ȃ the NPS - 
and CRC staff were not allowed an audience at court (Robinson 2018). Thus, although Ǯǯǡses are allocated to 
CRCs by NPS court teams, on the basis of a risk assessment. While the rationale for the 
decision to insulate court work from private interests in this way was clear, it put CRCs 
at one remove from sentencers, bringing into question the idea of sentencers as direct 
commissioners of services delivered by CRCs. Transforming Rehabilitation also created a Ǯǯǡ
between the courts and the CRCs, but which can also procure services directly from 
CRCs, as part of a package of interventions offered to its own (high risk) cases. It is 
against this backdrop that we analysed the CRC websites and sought to understand 
their own processes of audience construction.  
 
The majority of the homepages included tabs or links to information targeting specific 
audiences. In most cases, the intended audience was very clear (e.g. tabs labelled ǮǯǢǮǯǢǮǯǢǮǯȌǢother cases an intended audience could be inferred reasonably easily (e.g. 
tabs lǮǫǯ ǮǯȌǤ Only two CRCs (Warwickshire & West 
Mercia and London) directly addressed victims by including a specific tab to this ǮǯǤA small number however gave no clues as to their intended 
audience(s). For example, the Norfolk & Suffolk homepage was extremely basic, 
featuring very little information, a single image, and no links that suggested any specific 
audience. Northumbria CRC, similarly, had no obvious target audience. A slightly 
different approach was found for Thames Valley CRC, which offered no direct clues (by 
way of tabs or links) as to its intended audience(s), but whose homepage was 
dominated by information about and images of unpaid work, thus giving the impression 
that its primary audience might be potential community beneficiaries (Bottoms 2008).  
 ǡǮǯǯǤ
references to tǮǯǤ
this was done explicitly (by providing an appropriately labelled tab), as in the case of 
the five Purple Futures CRCs; elsewhere the approach was more implicit, as was the case 
in Cumbria and Lancashire, Essex, and Northumbria, which all featured invitations to 
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ǮǯȋǤǤȌǤ
this attention to the community as a beneficiary of probation work was part of a Ǯǯǡ
continuation of what went before, we cannot be sure, but it is nonetheless interesting Ǯǯ as a potential beneficiary of the labour carried out 
by people subject to community sentences in this way.  
 
Despite the somewhat remote relationship between sentencers and CRCs discussed 
above, we found that more than half of CRCs (n=12) explicitly referǮǯ
a target audience for their website. For example, the homepage of the Essex CRC had a ǮǯǮGuide for Interventions: IǤǯ 
Ǯ-ȋȌǯ
provided to the courts in Essex, including Rehabilitation Activity Requirements, 
Accredited Programmes, Community Payback (i.e. unpaid work in the community) and 
other potential requirements that can form part of a community sentence. Similarly the 
(uniformly branded) homepages of the Purple Futures- owned CRCs each included an Ǯǯǡ
available interventions; statistics on the numbers of people under supervision; and ǮǯǤInformation for sentencers did not, however, include details about the ǯȂ either because the sentencers are not paying directly, or 
because this aspect of the work was regarded as something best kept hidden. 
 
Probation for sale: commodifǮǯ 
 
The CRC websites differed very significantly in the degree to which they explicitly ǮaleǯǤWorking 
Links CRCs. Each of these had a section called Ǯǯ Ǯǯ, listing the services provided by the CRCs, information about how costings for 
services could be obtained and specifying that payment must be made in advance. For 
instance, the Dorset, Devonshire and Cornwall Service Directory provided the following 
information:   
 
We will invoice you or your service user prior to the assessment and will request 
payment in full, by cheque or via BACS, before the intervention starts. (DDC CRC, Service 
Directory Version 7, p.6).  
 
The Working Links websites were also unusual in that they noted the availability of their 
services to a potentially wide range of purchasers. For example, the Wales CRC website 
stated: 
 ǥ ambition is to make our services available to everyone who would value them, not 
just those people who have been sentenced by a court. We see this as a first step 
towards making our ambition a reality. (Wales CRC, Service Directory)8. 
 
Some of the CRC webǮǯǡ
available to downloadǤǮǯ
cost of these services. For example, the Essex CRC Rate Card provided details on the 
costs of a range Ǯǯȋ ? ? ?ǡ
                                               
8 http://walescrc.co.uk/content/view/service+directory (Accessed: 05.01.19).  
15 
 
ȌǤǮǯǣ
maintenance of shared information exchange systems with the police; group drop-in 
sessions and individual offence focused work; and home visits by CRC and the police. A Ǯǯoup module was also advertised (2 x1.5 hours sessions for 
£250)ǡǲ
successfully coǳ(Essex CRC, Rate Card, 2017: 25). 
 
Such explicit information on the costs of services and how they could be purchased was 
not however readily accessible on most of the websites. This reinforced both our 
perception of the diffuse and sometimes confused construction of the audiences of the 
CRCsǯ, but also the rather muted commercial business aspect of the 
CRCs. As mentioned earlier, links to the parent companies and their wider business 
interests could be accessed through a search of the websites, but were usually not 
immediately apparent. We suggest that the relatively hidden commercial aspect of the ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯǡǤǤmorally tainted aspect of the trade and focusing instead on Ǯǯ
individuals. We return to these points in our discussion below.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Our analysis of the websites of the 21 CRCs created under the Transforming 
Rehabilitation reforms shows that there are some elements of continuity in the ǮǯǤ
continuity can be seen in the mandated use of a recognisable logo, and in the adoption 
by many of the CRCs of a particular colour palette, both of which pre-date privatisation. 
Our analysis also revealed continuity in the Ǯǯ
objectives of the CRCs. This is another established Ǯǯǯ
public sector past. Following Thumala et al (2011), we have used the concept of Ǯǯto describe the means by which the private probation sector Ȃ in 
common with the private security industry - seeks to legitimize its work by drawing on 
the tropes and iconography of more respected or established professions. Our analysis Ǯǯ, both in 
respect of the visual elements noted above and (in many cases) by linking their 
establishment to a narrative about the evolution of probation over time. However, in the 
probation context the extent of such borrowing was found to be limited by a paucity of 
well-established symbols. Indeed a notable feature of probation since its inception is the 
absence of a recognizable visual iconography. Unlike prisons, probation sanctions have 
no obvious physical architecture or structural locus and those who administer them are 
not identifiable in the way that police or prison officers are, by virtue of their uniforms. 
Thus, both the sanctions and those who enact them fail to generate ready images that 
can be drawn upon for marketing purposes. 
 
Our analysis of the websites of the CRCs shows some of the difficulties in making the ǮǯǤ, the visual 
iconography of probation is limited, and this is partly as a result of the nature of the 
enterprise. Typically a person who is subject to a community sentence is placed under 
some form of supervision in the community and they may be required to engage in or 
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ǤǮǯ
conveys a certain contingency, a period of testing and conditionality. While recent 
research has explored the experiences of such conditionality, and indeed has utilised 
visual methods to do this (see for examples: McNeill, 2018; Healy and Fitzgibbon, 2019), 
the reality is that conditionality or contingency is by its very nature quite difficult to 
convey. 
 
The images we found in our analysis depict a very narrow range of activities: most 
frequently, people meeting (presumably to talk about how a person fulfils the condition 
of their supervision) and people in high-ǮǯǤǮǯ
the websites of the CRCs.  On one level this is unsurprising given that this element of 
probation work was placed squarely in the domain of the CRCs, but it is also reflective of 
the fact that this form of sentence - through the requirement that people wear high 
visibility clothing and carry out work in public areas Ȃ has in recent years been the focus 
of explicit attempts to render it visible to the public, thereby enhancing its external Ǯǯ (King and Maruna, 2008). Indeed, there is a 
connection here between the ubiquitous imagery of unpaid work and the construction Ǯǯǯǡ
several websites. Both chime with the dominant utilitarian rationale for probation work 
which has been particularly evident in policy pronouncements in the last two decades 
(Robinson 2008). These rationales emphasise the social and economic benefits and 
savings that stem from probation work, and tend to construct the public and victims of 
crime Ȃ rather than offenders themselves Ȃ as its primary beneficiaries. Narratives 
about probation and community sanctions that emphasise their social value are 
arguably both convenient and useful to CRCs to the extent that they deflect attention 
from narratives that emphasise shareholders and profit-making that are likely to be less 
palatable to some audiences.  
 Ǯǯ
readily evident on most of the websites, and that information about the parent 
companies (several of which are large corporate enterprises) was far from prominent. ǮǯȂ 
of hiding the less palatable truths about contemporary probation services Ȃ future 
research might explore this possibility by means of interviews with key actors, as 
conducted by researchers who have examined strategies of legitimation in the private 
security industry (Thumala et al 2011; White 2010, 2014). It is only via such methods 
that we can explore the communicative intentions of those with responsibility for 
marketing probation services. Further research of this kind would also help us to 
answer nagging questions about the perceived value (to CRCs themselves) of websites 
as means of communication; about their construction of audiences and consumers of 
probation work; and, in the case of parent companies with multiple CRCs, their choices 
in respect of ǮǯǤ 
 
Since undertaking our analysis, the Ministry of Justice has announced a new phase of 
probation reform, which will see the return of all offenders under community 
supervision to the public sector, under the management of the National Probation 
Service (Ministry of Justice 2019). At the same time, the CRCs will be dissolved and their 
contracts terminated. However, the intention remains to contract out significant 
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elements of the probation role to the market place, and both Unpaid Work and ǮǯǤ
Probation Service and potentially new for-profit providers of probation services will 
seek to communicate and market themselves after the next iteration of reform, and how 
they will construct their audiences, remains to be seen. We will be watching with 
interest. 
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